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Abstract 
On 25 April 2015 central Nepal was struck by a magnitude 7.8 earthquake which 
killed over 9000 people and displaced 2.8 million. The image of the Dharahara, a 
nineteenth century minaret which collapsed during the quake, quickly became for 
many Nepalis an iconic representation not only of the disaster but also of a national 
determination to recover and rebuild. Edward Simpson has argued that the aftermath 
of a disaster is ‘a product of the longer history of a locality’ and it is the aftermath 
‘that may reveal what is dear’ (Simpson 2013: 53, 50). Drawing upon media and 
literary discourse in the Nepali language, this article asks why the Dharahara tower 
loomed so large in the Nepali imagination in the immediate aftermath of the April 
2015 earthquake, rather than the country’s severely damaged World Heritage sites, 
and why it became a rallying point for a resurgence of Nepali hill nationalism. 
Keywords: Disasters, nationalism, heritage, Nepal, public memory, politics 
thado nak samasta kantipurko he ucchata kritrim! 
jyami lakh thiyau pavitra pasina he meghko ashram! 
seto stambha sukirtiko Dharahara!  deu malai bida! 
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he aglo prahari sari nagarko! deu malai bida! 
 
Oh, man-made height, the nose held high of all of Kantipur! 
Oh, refuge of the clouds, we [who built you] were a hundred thousand labourers, our 
sacred sweat!   
Oh Dharahara, white pillar of glory, bid me farewell! 
Oh towering guard of the city, bid me farewell! 
 
(Siddhicharan Shrestha, Bhimsen Thapa Mahakavya, 11:14; (Shrestha 2073 bs: 53))i 
 
Kathmadauko nautalle Dharahara! 
Kathmadauko nautalle Dharahara! 
 
The nine-storeyed Dharahara of Kathmandu! 
The nine-storeyed Dharahara of Kathmandu! 
 
(From the film ‘Gorkhali’ [https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EYjmOhcMMSE]) 
 
 
Introduction 
 
Disaster aftermaths have been the subject of a large number of empirical studies since 
the publication of Samuel Prince’s groundbreaking Catastrophe and Social Change 
(1920). The emerging field of Disaster Studies is now also underpinned by a growing 
body of theoretical literature, whose authors invariably represent disasters generically 
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not only as challenges to state authorities, which are expected to cope with the 
immediate needs of the affected population, but also as opportunities for groups within 
that population who wish to contest pre-existing structures of power. Notably, Pelling 
and Dill (2010) discuss the potential for a disaster to provide either a ‘critical juncture’ 
(a contestation of established political, economic and cultural power) or an ‘accelerated 
status quo’ (a successful concentration of that power).  In many instances, the prospect 
of change appears to be looming in the immediate aftermath of a disaster, only for it to 
be eclipsed and disappear once more from view as the regime that held power before 
the disaster regains control and reinstates the political status quo ante, often in 
‘accelerated’ form.  This is perhaps because, ultimately, the impacts of a disaster do not 
represent a ‘discontinuity of the social system’ as much as a ‘difficult extension of 
current life’ (Albala-Bertrand 1993: 22). 
 
Anthony Oliver-Smith has argued that ‘the fundamental features of society and culture 
are laid bare in stark relief’ by disasters (1996: 304), which ‘often reveal the deeper 
social grammar of a people’ (Oliver-Smith and Hoffman 2001: 10).  But in his 
influential study of the political aftermath of the 2001 Gujarat earthquake, Edward 
Simpson disagrees.  He describes the post-disaster period of ‘abnormality and 
confusion’ during which people are ‘nice to one another, undifferentiated, as victims of 
a common calamity’ as a ‘short-lived and exceptional moment, marked by the failure 
of everyday grammar, rather than its refinement or condensation. It is instead the 
aftermath that may reveal what is dear’ (Simpson 2013: 50). When the population 
affected by a disaster is ethnically, linguistically or culturally diverse and patterns of 
inequality that derive from this diversity are historically entrenched, political and 
cultural contestation become inextricably intertwined. A population that has suffered 
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the impact of a disaster is inevitably more aware of the ‘cultural battles’ of the aftermath 
than those who come from outside to intervene (Simpson 2013: 96), and the traditions, 
artefacts, buildings and practices that turn out to be most ‘dear’ to the affected 
population may not be exactly what others expect them to be. In the case that will be 
considered here, the symbol that was adopted as a focal point for the most visible public 
expressions of grief was one that was widely seen, both domestically and 
internationally, as an architectural anachronism of little value or importance.  
 
This discussion is concerned with the aftermath of the 2015 Gorkha earthquake in 
Nepal, and its relationship to questions of history, identity and public memory.  
Drawing upon literary and media discourse in the Nepali language,ii the discussion will 
revolve around the ruined stump of the Dharahara, a 203-foot tower first built nearly 
two hundred years ago in Kathmandu, which collapsed during the magnitude 7.8 
earthquake that struck central districts of Nepal on 25 April 2015.  The Dharahara was 
unloved by the generations of cultural historians who have documented the tangible 
and intangible riches of the Kathmandu Valley’s heritage because of its non-native or 
imported architectural design. In 1912 it was described in the following 
uncomplimentary terms by a British visitor, the art historian Percy Brown:  
 
Towards the centre of the city there arises, far above all other buildings, a stone tower or column, the 
most striking, but probably least interesting erection in Katmandu (sic).  It is about 200 feet high, and is 
a notable landmark from all parts of the valley. Built by the Gurkha General Bhim Sen, it was not raised 
for any particular purpose but merely as a freak, and has long since been called Bhim Sen’s folly (Brown 
1912: 67). 
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Similarly, the Dharahara merits no more than a single reluctant mention in Slusser’s 
Nepal Mandala, widely regarded as the most authoritative study of the cultural history 
of the Kathmandu Valley, in a paragraph which also dismisses the ‘new-style domed 
temple’ that appeared in the Valley during the 17th and 18th centuries as a ‘rustic and 
even pathetic imitation of Mughal architecture’:  
 
It was during the Shah period that the Dharahara, a tower imitating the Mughal minarets, was erected 
just outside the Kathmandu city walls, where its fanciful form still dominates the city skyline (Slusser 
1982: 78). 
 
However, the destruction of this ‘fanciful’ building had a greater and more immediate 
emotional impact upon a large section of the Nepali public than the loss of the temples 
and shrines of Nepal’s World Heritage sites whose destruction was so grievously 
mourned by the wider world, iii and at first even the destruction of over 750,000 homes, 
schools and other buildings across the fourteen hill districts that were most seriously 
affected. Why did the public of a country that had until 1990 been the world’s last 
Hindu kingdom, a country that was still imagined by most of the wider world as 
culturally exotic and inherently religious, adopt as the symbol of its grief a plain, secular 
building built in a postcolonial Islamic style that had recently been made into a 
corporatized tourist attraction?  Why did the Dharahara come to symbolise for so many 
Nepali citizens not only their country’s losses but also its determination to rebuild, thus 
providing their political leaders with a well of public sentiment upon which they could 
draw to pursue their own post-disaster political agenda?  In what follows I will attempt 
to answer these questions, but first it is necessary briefly to explore the history of the 
monument in question and its possible meanings for past and present generations of 
Nepalis. 
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The creation and meaning of the Dharahara 
In 1816, after two years of sporadic fighting in Nepal’s foothills, the troops of the 
British East India Company achieved victory over the army of Gorkha, the rapidly 
expanding hill kingdom whose Shah kings assembled the modern nation-state now 
known as Nepal.  This military defeat marked the end of some 70 years of rapid 
Gorkhali expansion, during which the Indo-Aryan elites of the hills extended their 
domination of west and central Nepal to new territories in the east.  The political and 
cultural ascendancy of this elite endures today, and is reflected in its disproportionate 
representation in public office, land ownership and economic activity.   
 
From 1806 until his dramatic fall from power in 1837, the mukhtiyar [Commander-in -
Chief of the Army] Bhimsen Thapa was the most powerful man in Nepal.iv  Sources 
differ on whether the Dharahara he built in the grounds of his mansion, the Bagh 
Darbar, was the first or second of two similar structures.v   In 1832 the British Resident 
in Kathmandu, Brian Hodgson, recorded the existence of two minarets in this locality.vi  
According to Hodgson, the smaller of the pair was named after Bhimsen Thapa and 
built in the garden of the Bagh Darbar, and the taller one, a structure with a broader 
base known as the upper or upallo dharahara, was built by or for the junior Shah queen 
Maharani Lalit Tripura Sundari,vii just to the north. The towers are said to have been 
built in 1824/5 and 1832, but there is some uncertainty about which was built on which 
date.viii During a major earthquake in 1833, one of the two Dharaharas collapsed 
completely and was not rebuilt, while the other was only partially damaged and was 
quickly restored. It was most probably the larger of the two towers (the one named for 
the Queen) that was rebuilt, and not the smaller one, because at this stage of Nepali 
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history Bhimsen’s political star was waning.ix 
 
It is widely believed that the original towers were modelled on monuments in India 
such as the minarets that stand at the four corners of the Taj Mahal complex at Agra, or 
the Qutb Minar in Delhi. Unfortunately, we have no way of knowing what the creators 
of the Nepali versions of these monuments intended in terms of their meaning and 
purpose. Sidewalkers (P) Ltd, the company which has managed the Dharahara site since 
2004/5 (see below), erected a number of information signboards in both English and 
Nepali around the base of the tower which recorded a version of its history. On these 
signboards (which remained in situ for three years after the 2015 earthquake) it is stated 
that the Dharahara’s main purpose was to enable the state and city authorities to 
summon people to gather on the Tundikhel (the military parade ground to the north-
east of the tower) to hear government announcements, and that it showed ‘the religious 
harmony between Hindu, Muslim and Christian faiths’.  It offers as supporting evidence 
for this latter assertion the fact that the topmost floor contains a Shiva shrine, that the 
tower is built in Mughal style, and that the railings around its base are in a European 
style.  While the historical function of the tower as a public gathering-point is well 
attested in historical sources, this does not shed much light on the originally intended 
symbolism of the structure; and the conception of the Dharahara as a symbol of 
religious unity is not a notion I have come across in any other source.  
 
Of course, the level of convergence between the original intended meaning and the 
contemporary public understanding of a monument will inevitably vary from structure 
to structure. Nelson and Olin record that Alois Riegl, the first conservator general of 
monuments in the Austro-Hungarian empire, distinguished between the ‘intentional 
 8 
monument’, whose ‘significance is determined by its makers’ and the ‘unintentional 
monument’, which is the product of later events. Some monuments are created for a 
political, cultural or religious reason and invested with a specific meaning at the point 
of their creation, which they carry, essentially unchanged, down through the 
generations. Others may be created for a more functional purpose, but then acquire 
significance and meaning because of events that take place after their founding.  A third 
category of monuments may be invested with one specific meaning or set of meanings 
at the point of their creation, but then acquire a different set of meanings for later 
generations—perhaps because their original meaning has become objectionable or 
contentious due to political or cultural shifts in the society that surrounds them, or 
simply because their originally intended meaning has been forgotten or mis-
remembered (Nelson and Olin 2003: 1-2).  Finally, there are monumental ruins: ‘the 
memory left by a monument after it has been destroyed: a memory of absence’ (Elsner 
2003: 211). 
 
At the time of its creation the first Dharahara was, as ‘a deposit of the historical 
possession of power’ (Phillips 2003: 281), surely an ‘intentional monument’. Given the 
historical context of its creation and the identity of its patron, it seems reasonable to 
interpret its intended meaning in terms of defiance and nationalistic pride, directed at 
the British East India Company that had defeated Bhimsen Thapa’s forces and installed 
a British Resident in Kathmandu. Although it may be conceived of as a ‘public history 
site’ (Walkowitz and Knauer 2009) by some, it is probably more accurately described 
as a symbol of ‘state-sponsored triumphalism’ (Winter 1999).x   As Anne Rademacher 
observes in her study of riverside monuments in Kathmandu, 
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Although the British never established full formal control in Nepal, colonial power had clear effects, and 
complicity and cooperation with the British went a long way toward reproducing state 
power.  Nevertheless, the fact of independence has combined over time with narratives of bravery and 
defiance to form a fundamental theme in official constructions of Nepal's national history and identity 
(Rademacher 2009: 232). 
 
Once it had been reconstructed in the wake of the 1833 earthquake, the remaining 
Dharahara remained intact, ‘visible from afar and overlooking the entire valley’ in the 
words of an early foreign visitor, Prince Waldemar of Prussia, until the next major 
earthquake struck Nepal in 1934, bringing the Dharahara down again. The Rana artist 
and litterateur Balkrishna Sama (1903-81) recorded his first sight of its ruins in his 
memoirs: 
 
With great sadness I took a picture of the breast of the Tundikhel, split wide open.  When I saw the 
Dharahara cut down, with only the bottom four storeys remaining, it looked to me like some heroic 
Nepali whose head had been cut off at [the battle of] Nalapani but who still stood guard at Bhimsen 
Thapa’s gate as a murkutta [headless ghost] (Sama 1972/3 (2029 b.s.): 213-4)   
 
A photograph in the English translation of the only detailed account of the 1934 
earthquake shows the site surrounded by scaffolding for repairs (Rana 2013: 136ff.).  
The new structure, completed in 1936, had nine storeys rather than the original eleven, 
and a gallery was added to its upper portion. As the Sidewalkers signboards correctly 
state, in the years that followed a bugle was sounded from the Dharahara to call the 
army to assemble on the Tundikhel or to call civil servants to the palace armoury, and 
also to summon the populace for important announcements.xi   
 
 10 
Pierre Nora has argued that ‘modern societies’ live within a ‘historical’ rather than a 
‘memorial’ consciousness of time and that ‘memory has been dissipated by the 
incursions of the modern world’.  However, the residues of this memory have 
nonetheless coalesced around particular lieux de memoire, which Nora defines as 
‘monuments of history torn away from the movement of history, then returned; no 
longer quite life, not yet death, like shells on the shore when the sea of living memory 
has receded’ (quoted in Wood 1994: 128). So there the Dharahara stood for another two 
generations, half torn away from history as a residual artefact of a half-forgotten 
Gorkhali national pride, while the urban fabric of Kathmandu changed rapidly all 
around it, especially after the political and economic liberalisations of the 1990s.  In 
2004/5 (2061 b.s.) the management of the site was passed to Sidewalkers Pvt Ltd., 
which appears to have been established for the sole purpose of managing the Dharahara, 
reflecting a Nepali edition of the ‘growing role given to public history sites for state 
patriotic veneration, corporate financial gain, or urban renewal “heritage” 
entertainment in the worldwide spread of the modernist enterprise’ (Walkowitz and 
Knauer 2009:9). Its management allowed members of the public to climb the 
Dharahara’s internal staircase to take in the panoramic view from the top for a fee of 
55 Nepali rupees, and a small public garden, a café and a ticket office were established 
at the foot of the tower.  It became a popular attraction for Nepali sightseers, including 
people from outside the capital valley. A Sidewalkers employee to whom I spoke at the 
site in 2016 informed me that 150-200 people used to ascend the tower on ordinary 
days, and up to 300 on holidays.xii The experience of climbing the Dharahara to admire 
the view of Kathmandu from its balcony became a heritage commodity that possessed 
something of the symbolic meaning of a visit to the Eiffel Tower, as described here by 
Barthes: 
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…by its very position as a visited outlook, the Tower makes the city into a kind of Nature; it constitutes 
the swarming of men into a landscape, it adds to the frequently grim urban myth a romantic dimension, 
a harmony, a mitigation; by it, starting from it, the city joins up with the great natural themes which are 
offered to the curiosity of men: the ocean, the storm, the mountains, the snow, the rivers (Barthes 1964: 
241). 
 
 
Public and media reactions to the fall of the Dharahara 
The Dharahara collapsed for the second (or possibly third) time between 11.56 and 
11.57 a.m. on Saturday 25 April 2015, killing and injuring a large number of people, 
many of whom were inside the tower when the earthquake struck. The news of its 
destruction had a powerful emotional impact on many Nepalis, including people living 
outside the capital, many of whom knew it only from photographs. The journalist Sarala 
Gautam, who at the time of the earthquake was travelling in Jajarkot, a western hill 
district that was largely unaffected by it, reported that it was when local people heard 
that the Dharahara had fallen that they understood the scale of the calamity: they then 
realised that ‘the disaster was not small’. It became clear to Gautam that for many 
Nepalis in the western hills, almost regardless of their ethnicity, caste or gender, the 
Dharahara was still the pre-eminent symbol of their capital city’s, and therefore their 
nation’s, identity. Gautam recalled many conversations with people whose first 
comment when they heard she had come from Kathmandu was ‘Oh, I hear the 
Dharahara fell down (e, dharahara dhalyo re)’: 
 
 ‘It’s so sad’ she said, ‘The Dharahara has fallen.’  I asked her if she had ever visited Kathmandu.  No, 
she said, she’d seen it on Facebook.  Nowadays Facebook shows everything.  She was Kalpana BK, aged 
27.  Her husband was working in Malaysia. They talked on a mobile when she went to a shop in 
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Chaurajahari that had the internet running.  She told me that she had been planning to go to Kathmandu 
and see the Dharahara when her husband returned from Malaysia.  But now her wish had collapsed 
(Gautam 2015). 
 
The hundreds of first-person accounts of the 2015 earthquake that appeared in Nepali-
language newspapers, magazines and social media in the aftermath typically contain an 
early and very specific reference to the moment when their authors received the news 
that the Dharahara had fallen.  For these people too, this was the moment when the 
sheer scale and gravity of the disaster first impressed itself upon them. Writing less than 
three weeks after the earthquake, the senior journalist Kishor Nepal argued that the 
collapse of the Dharahara had had a massive psychological effect on the people of the 
capital city, most of which escaped the disaster comparatively unscathed: 
 
…although some important places, bazaars and settlements in Kathmandu suffered extensive damage 
and saw a major loss of life and property, most parts of the inner city remained secure.  Even so, the level 
of fear among the people of Kathmandu is very high and very dense.  The main psychological reason for 
this fear is the shattering of the Dharahara, a tall minaret erected as a show of power in imitation of the 
Islamic empire.  If the Dharahara had not broken and if there had not been damage in and around 
Hanuman Dhoka, the centre of state power, the current level of dread would not have spread through 
people’s minds (Nepal 2015). 
 
All quarters of the Nepali news media understood this quickly, regardless of their 
political leanings, and gave more coverage to the collapse of the Dharahara than to the 
destruction of any other building.  Thus, the Dharahara quickly became the icon of 
Nepali resilience and determination to rebuild.  When I visited Kathmandu in July 2015 
(two months before the promulgation of the new constitution and the ‘Indian blockade’ 
that followed) many young people could be seen wearing T-shirts bearing the image of 
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the Dharahara and various versions, in both English and Nepali, of the slogan ‘we will 
rise again’.   The iconic image of the tower also became a popular design for tattoos on 
arms and legs in the growing number of tattoo parlours across the city: some young 
Nepalis had clearly been affected by its destruction so much that they were willing to 
have its image inscribed permanently on their bodies (Lotter 2018).   
 
The Dharahara also featured extensively in Nepali-language poetry—the medium in 
which public sentiment finds its quickest expression in Nepal—during the immediate 
aftermath of the 25 April earthquake. Of the five poems published in the literature 
section of the influential online newspaper Setopati within 24 hours of the disaster, 
three were inspired by the destruction of the Dharahara.  Under a photograph of the 
Dharahara captioned, in English, ‘Pray for Nepal’, Acharya Prabha’s poem addressed 
the Dharahara with the informal second person pronoun timi.  The poem described the 
tower as ‘the grandeur and pride of the country’ and suggested that all should apply a 
tika from its ruins to their foreheads and then wash them off to create a ‘heap’ (dhiko) 
of unity. 
 
Where might we search for you now? 
With what touch can I meet you?   
With what water can I slake 
My thirst for you?  
Oh, my tall Dharahara, 
Why did you become like this today, 
So far far away from us?xiii 
 
A second poem, by Niru Tripathi, bade the Dharahara farewell, using an Urdu salutation 
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(albida) that suggested an awareness of its Mughal architectural ancestry. The poem 
asserted that ‘an age has ended with you’ and ended in lines of reproach:  
 
Why did you melt away and collapse completely, leaving everything behind?  
I did not think you were so selfish.  
Why did you put all your beloved ones to sleep on a single pyre?xiv 
 
Anger quickly followed fear in the public response to the earthquake, and this was 
mainly directed inward at the national government for what was seen as a callous and 
uncaring lack of preparedness, and an inadequate response.  Nepal’s vulnerability to art 
theft is well known, and media reports of the disappearance of religious icons from 
temples and shrines cause anger and outrage at regular intervals. In the immediate 
aftermath of the quake, many reports were published online of the looting of 
archaeological remnants, in which it was alleged that government servants colluded.  In 
one such report, it was alleged that a driver employed by a senior civil servant was seen 
at the site of the collapsed Dharahara collecting bricks which dated from the 
reconstruction of the tower carried out in 1936 during the reign of Juddha Shamsher 
Rana, in order to sell them on the international market.xv One year later, it was reported 
on the same online news site that bricks from the Dharahara were being taken to a 
dumping site and that government officials were being dismissive of public concern 
about this.xvi  
 
Many newspaper op-eds blamed Nepali society itself for inviting the calamity, asserting 
repeatedly that the earthquake was a consequence of human venality, conceit and 
ambition. This was often seen as manifesting itself in the building boom that has taken 
place in the Kathmandu Valley since the 1990s, and particularly in the construction of 
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tall buildings.  But it was also seen in the alleged weakness of political leadership.  To 
cite one typical example: 
 
The Dharahara fell in the 1934 earthquake too, and was reconstructed.  But less than 82 years had passed 
before it fell again. If it is to be re-erected, now we must consider how strong and firm it should be.  This 
has symbolic meanings too.  We should not build a Dharahara that is weak like the nation’s leaders.  For 
the sake of the nation’s history the Dharahara must symbolically foster strong leadership (Sitaula 2015). 
 
It was as if the case of the Dharahara was providing a focal point for widespread public 
frustration with the Nepal government’s response to the earthquake.  A monument that 
for so many represented ordinary citizens’ patriotic pride had not been properly 
maintained, let alone strengthened to withstand earthquakes, by the politicians who 
sought their votes.  Not only that: the same venal politicians had sold it to a private 
company for commercial exploitation. The anonymous author of an op-ed article 
published in the Kathmandu Post three and a half months after the earthquake blamed 
the death toll on the decision to open the tower to the public in 2005, which s/he 
believed was inspired purely by motives of profit: ‘the Dharahara… was never meant 
to be a sightseeing tower for the people’.xvii In his lament for the Dharahara, addressed, 
like so many poems, to the building itself, Santosh Chimariya (2015) sees this as a 
desecration: 
 
In the course of time, even you were engulfed by the open market epidemic.  Your decrepit 200-year-old 
body was opened for people to climb for a payment.  Nobody was at all interested in your restoration, 
repair or conservation, but permission was given to those who wished to climb onto your shoulders and 
reach your summit for a view of Alakapuri Nagari [the capital city of the mythical Yakshas]  if they paid 
a fee. 
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It is not certain how many people were killed by the collapse of the Dharahara.  In fact, 
news reports did not dwell on these fatalities or enumerate them very consistently.xviii 
If the Dharahara was going to serve as an icon for a popular movement that would 
rebuild Nepal anew, it needed not only to kindle anger but also to offer hope. Thus, the 
Nepali news media carried numerous stories about the survivors of its fall, which 
provided the backdrop for tales of survival, resilience and hope for the future. 
 
The story of 18-year-old Prashamsa Shrestha, published in the Nepali-language 
Nagarik newspaper a year after the earthquake, serves as an example.   Prashamsa left 
her home in Dhobighat with her elder sister Shanti on the morning of the quake.  As it 
was a Saturday, they planned to roam around the city taking photos on their phones to 
upload onto Facebook.  They headed first for the Dharahara, climbed slowly to the top, 
and photohraphed the view.  When the earthquake struck, Prashamsa was on the 
balcony, and she clung to the railing as the tower collapsed beneath her.  A man named 
Raju Lama extracted her from the debris and put her into an ambulance. She has since 
undergone multiple operations on her leg and can now walk slowly (all costs of her 
treatment have been borne by Basanta Chaudhary, of the leading Nepali industrialist 
family.) Now she is determined to study BSc Nursing.xix  The report is typical of the 
genre: most of the survivors whose stories are told were on the viewing balcony when 
the earthquake struck; they all have courage and optimism for the future; and the stories 
often contain examples of heroic rescue and sometimes, as in this case, philanthropy.  
 
Since its destruction the form of the Dharahara has been recreated in both real and 
virtual spaces.  Within a few months, a miniature Dharahara was built at the traffic 
intersection immediately opposite the site of the original.  One year later, it was reported 
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that a 21-metre replica was being built in the grounds of a secondary school in 
Nawalparasi district, at an estimated cost of Rs 1.5 million.xx  Many others have been 
built since, including a 20-foot replica beside the Prithvi Highway near Malekhu. In 
cyber space too, the Dharahara lives on.  It has its own Twitter identity 
(@DharaharaKTM) where images of replicas created in various locations have been 
posted.  In the wake of terrorist attacks in Paris in November 2015, one Nepali Twitter 
user posted an image of the Dharahara mounted on top of the Eiffel Tower, with the 
caption ‘Pray for France’. Youtube also carries numerous Dharahara-related videos. 
These include a presentation which claims that the two original Dharahara towers 
survived until 1934, and presents them as Nepal’s ‘Twin Towers’, thus attempting to 
draw a parallel with the destruction of the World Trade Centre in New York in 2001 
and to identify the Dharahara site as Kathmandu’s own ‘Ground Zero’:  
 
Now our nation lost both of them in Earth Quakes.  Please watch this video to create awareness to rebuild 
both of them.  They are pride of Nepal and Nepali People, Two chambers in the heart of Kathmandu.xxi   
 
At least one attempt was made to profit commercially from the outpouring of public 
sentiment.  A full-page colour advertisement for NCell (Nepal’s largest mobile phone 
network) appeared in the Nepal Patrika weekly news magazine of 28 June 2015, 
showing the form of the ruined Dharahara shaped in clay turning on a potter’s wheel, 
with a potter’s hands upon it.  The text beneath the image read: 
 
IF WE UNITE IN BELIEF AND ACTION, WE WILL BUILD OUR NEPAL.  Although wounded at 
heart, our courage is not diminished.  Our sleep has flown away but our dream is yet unbroken.  The 
present is wounded but hope of a future has not died. Turning the present into history… aiming at a new 
future, we will walk together, we Nepalis. 
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The political context of the Dharahara’s fall  
The discourse generated by the destruction of the Dharahara needs to be understood 
against the backdrop of ongoing sociocultural and political contestation in Nepal, to 
explain which a brief excursus is necessary at this point in the discussion. 
 
Table 1: Nepal: Outline Political Chronology 
1768-9 Conquest of the Kathmandu Valley by Prithvi Narayan Shah, King of Gorkha, leading 
to the ‘unification’ and creation of modern Nepal  
1816 Gorkha forced to accept a treaty reducing its territorial scope and power after defeat 
in the Anglo-Nepalese Wars  
1846-1951 Rana family autocracy established in a coup and maintained with increasing reliance 
on the British colonial power in India.   
1962-90 Panchayat regime of ‘partyless democracy’ under Kings Mahendra and Birendra, after 
Mahendra dismisses Nepali Congress administration elected in 1959. 
1990  First Jan Andolan (‘People’s Movement’) leads to the abolition of the Panchayat 
system.  Minority ethnic groups organise to press for greater inclusivity.  
1991-2002 Series of short-lived party-led governments  
1996-2006 Maoist ‘People’s War’ 
2006-7 Second Jan Andolan, against King Gyanendra, leads to a Comprehensive Peace 
Agreement between the Maoists and the parliamentary parties.  An Interim 
Constitution is promulgated and Nepal is declared a secular state. 
2008 Election of first Constituent Assembly.  Nepal is declared a republic; the monarchy is 
abolished. However, the Constituent Assembly fails to deliver a new constitution and 
is dissolved in 2012 
2013 Election of second Constituent Assembly.   
2015 25 April: Gorkha Earthquake, followed by several months of smaller earthquakes and 
aftershocks. 
 20 September: promulgation of new constitution introducing a new federal structure 
 October: the ‘blockade’ of Kathmandu, mounted by Madhesi organisations with 
Indian support, begins.  It lasts until the following spring. 
 
A century of Rana family autocracy ended in 1951, soon after the departure of the 
British colonial power from the Indian subcontinent. During the 1950s, the palace, the 
new political parties and the feudal landlords of the displaced old order jostled for 
power. The Nepali Congress Party, led by the charismatic BP Koirala, appeared to have 
come out on top when it won a majority in the elections of 1959.  
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However, King Mahendra dismissed the Congress government less than two years after 
its election to power and established a new political system, the panchayat vyavastha. 
Political parties and organisations advancing sectional interests and agendas were 
banned under this regime, and development became the all-encompassing theme of 
government programmes. Nepal benefited from its strategic location during the Cold 
War, receiving massive quantities of aid, and literacy and public consciousness of the 
wider world grew in leaps and bounds. Panchayat nationalism set out to homogenise 
Nepal’s national identity around the three pillars of the monarchy, the Nepali language 
and Hinduism, and political and cultural dissent was harshly suppressed.  
In 1990 a popular movement—the first Jan Andolan—forced King Birendra to 
dismantle the Panchayat system and give way to the re-establishment of multi-party 
democracy. A generation of politicians who had struggled for decades under the 
Panchayat regime felt that their time had come. A new constitution was promulgated 
and the Nepali Congress Party won the first general election. The opposition was 
dominated by parties espousing various forms of communist ideology, along with other 
more conservative elements who were disgruntled by the constitutional change.  
The early 1990s saw a major upsurge in the claiming of civil rights by the marginalised 
—notably the Adivasi Janajati (‘indigenous nationalities’), Madhesis, Dalits, and 
women. But the new democratic dispensation failed to deliver on its promises. The 
political parties spent more time and energy competing with one another for power, 
patronage and commission, and much less on implementing the promises in their 
manifestoes.  
Partly because of this, war broke out between the Nepal Communist Party (Maoist) and 
the Nepali state. This began in the mid-western hills in 1996 but had spread to almost 
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every district of Nepal by 2003. Over 16,000 lives were lost during a ten-year period, 
and Nepal saw severe abuses of human rights. In 2001, the family of King Birendra 
was massacred in Narayanhiti palace, probably by Crown Prince Dipendra, and King 
Gyanendra took the throne. Within five years he had succeeded in alienating both the 
mainstream parties and civil society so much that they made common cause with the 
Maoists against him.  
The war ended in 2006 when the Maoist insurgents and the parliamentary parties 
aligned themselves against the monarchy.  In 2007 an Interim Constitution was 
promulgated and a new national anthem was adopted (see Hutt 2012), and in 2008 a 
Constituent Assembly was elected to draft a new constitution for a secular, democratic, 
federal republican state of Nepal. The new constitution, it was promised, would ensure 
greater inclusivity and representation in a country where people other than men from 
among the upper castes (Bahuns and Chetris) of the hill regions and the upper strata of 
the Newar society of the Kathmandu Valley had been largely excluded from avenues 
of advancement and power.  The Maoists, who had now renounced armed struggle, 
confounded expectations by becoming the largest party in the Constituent Assembly.  
At its first meeting, in May 2008, the Assembly voted to abolish the Shah monarchy.   
 
Although the Constituent Assembly elected in 2008 was probably the most 
representative legislative body ever established in South Asia, its proceedings and 
decisions quickly came to be dominated once again by political party leaders, who 
failed to agree on a range of key issues, including the form of government and the 
structure of the new federal state, which Adivasi Janajati activists insisted should be 
determined by the geographical distribution of minority ethnic groups.  Having failed 
to deliver a constitution despite extensions to its original two-year term of office, the 
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Constituent Assembly came to the end of its life in May 2012.  After an 18-month 
interregnum, during which Nepal was governed by an administration headed by its 
Chief Justice, a new Constituent Assembly was elected in November 2013.  No party 
achieved an overall majority in these elections, but the Nepali Congress emerged as the 
single largest party and the Maoists’ share of the vote fell dramatically, leaving them 
in third place.  A new government based on a coalition of the Nepali Congress Party 
and the Nepal Communist Party (Unified Marxist-Leninist) was formed in February 
2014, with Sushil Koirala of the Nepali Congress Party as Prime Minister.  
 
This government was in power when the earthquake struck and it was not well prepared 
to deal with a disaster on such a scale.  The most immediate response came from the 
Nepali citizenry (particularly the young), the Nepal Army, and the Indian government.  
On the basis of a Post-Disaster Needs Assessment, international agencies and donor 
countries quickly pledged $4.4 billion of emergency aid to enable rescue and relief in 
the short term and reconstruction in the longer term.  For their part, the leaders of the 
four biggest political parties decided that the completion of the constitution should now 
be prioritized and fast-tracked.  A 16-point agreement was formalized between them 
for this purpose on 8 June. 
 
The ‘fast-tracked’ constitution that was promulgated on 20 September 2015 was 
greeted with celebrations in the hills of Nepal, but with public protests and brutal police 
reactions in the plains.  This was because it had failed to deliver on the long-held 
promise of a fairer deal for the Madhesis, the people of the southern Tarai plains. 
Madhesi political organisations resorted to doing one of the few things they can do to 
put pressure on the government of Nepal: they blockaded the main arterial road via 
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which Kathmandu receives the bulk of its key supplies.  As a result, there were severe 
shortages of key commodities in the capital, particularly of fuel.  Now led by Khadga 
Prasad Sharma Oli of the Nepal Communist Party (Unified Marxist-Leninist), who had 
replaced Sushil Koirala of the Nepali Congress Party as Prime Minister in October 
2015, the government resorted to nationalistic rhetoric in response, asserting loudly and 
repeatedly that the Indian government was ‘blockading’ Nepal in support of Madhesi 
demands. This led to a serious deterioration in relations—not only between the 
governments of India and Nepal, but also between the populations of Nepal’s hills and 
plains.  The political potency of the Dharahara as a symbol of nationalism (and arguably 
of Gorkhali hill nationalism at that) was not lost on the government of the day.   
 
Rebuilding the Dharahara 
In April 2016 Nepal’s Prime Minister, Khadga Prasad Sharma Oli, attended a function 
at the site of the Dharahara to mark the first anniversary of the quake.  A minute’s 
silence was observed, and the candle display laid out in nearby Basantapur Square on 
the same occasion featured the outlines of the Kasthamandapaxxii and the Dharahara, 
the two buildings that had by this time acquired the status of iconic representations of 
the disaster of twelve months before. 
 
A Dharahara Reconstruction Campaign had been launched by the Prime Minister in 
February 2016.  The Prime Minister declared, ‘The Dharahara is the symbol of our 
unity and strength; it is an identity of all Nepalis. It needs to be reconstructed through 
funds collected from each individual’ (Ojha 2016).  This sentiment was strongly 
endorsed by the editorial of the government-owned daily newspaper Gorkhapatra on 
18 February: ‘Every Nepali will feel that they have made their own contribution to the 
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reconstruction of the Dharahara.  There is no doubt at all that this will lead to the 
development of an enhanced sense of nationhood.’ Addressing the Legislative 
Assembly in June, the Prime Minister declared that the Dharahara was a parichay, a 
characteristic feature, of the nation: it was Nepal’s equivalent to ‘the towers that 
appeared when other nations’ names were mentioned’.  He said that it would be wrong 
to restore the Dharahara using funds from international aid or from the national 
treasury, and that it should be reconstructed from the level of the people so that people 
would think of it as ‘my Dharahara’.xxiii  Shortly after the first anniversary of the quake, 
an announcement was posted on the homepage of the National Reconstruction 
Authority website headed ‘The “My Dharahara I will Build It” Campaign’ (Mero 
Dharahara Ma Aphai Banaunchu Abhiyan).  This gave details of the bank account to 
which donations should be submitted and exhorted the Nepali people to contribute to 
the restoration of the Dharahara, which it described as ‘a symbol of the selfhood and 
pride (apnatva ra svabhiman) of the Nepali people (janata)’.  
 
However, one month after Prime Minister Oli had called on the public to donate, 
Republica newspaper reported that not a single rupee had been received, except for the 
money donated by the Prime Minister and other ministers as one month of their salaries. 
The Republica reporter attributed this to ‘lack of trust on the government’.xxiv It may 
also have been related to a controversy over Sidewalkers’ ownership and management 
of the site: ‘Why should the people apply their money to build Dharahara to feed 
businessmen? Give us an answer, Prime Minister’ read one posting on Facebook, which 
further alleged that the contract between Sidewalkers and the Kathmandu Municipality 
made the former responsible for its maintenance, repair and reconstruction.xxv 
Nyaupane (2015b) gives a highly critical account of the process by which Sidewalkers 
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acquired the contract to manage the site and of its custodianship thereafter.  He is 
particularly critical of the alleged lack of insurance cover for visitors to the building, 
which he claims was allowed to lapse within two years of the signing of the original 
contract,  and blames the Kathmandu Municipal Council for its neglect and lack of care.  
More broadly, objections were raised in the press and on social media to the expenditure 
of public funds on the restoration of a mundane monument when many quake-affected 
districts were still waiting for much-needed relief.   
 
The Director of the Government of Nepal’s Department of Archaeology, Bhesnarayan 
Dahal, is quoted by one source as saying that the seven Valley sites listed as World 
Heritage [vishva sampada] sitesxxvi were the first priority, and only after that would 
decisions be taken about the reconstruction of ‘national heritage’ (rastriya sampada) 
such as the Dharahara.  However, Nepal’s political leadership forged ahead with the 
idea of rebuilding the Dharahara through public subscription, and in August 2016 plans 
were unveiled for a new Dharahara.  According to newspaper reports, this would stand 
beside the remains of the old tower, which would be maintained as an earthquake 
memorial.  The new Dharahara would be restored to its pre-1934 dimensions, standing 
245 feet tall with two internal elevators. The new monument and adjoining park would 
cover a total area of 42 ropani, and include a three-storey parking lot.xxvii In September 
2018 the contract for the building of a new Dharahara was awarded to a Nepali 
construction company and its Chinese ‘joint venture partner’ and the foundation stone 
was laid by the Prime Minister on 26 December.xxviii 
 
A public dichotomy 
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The aftermath of the 2015 earthquake saw a resurgence of national feeling in Nepal 
after a ten-year period during which national identity had been a contested concept.  
Calls for unity and a common effort to enable Nepal to ‘rise again’ issued from every 
political quarter, though they were differently nuanced, with a significant number of 
voices calling for the building of a ‘new Nepal’ that would sweep the old order away.   
 
A fragile government that was reluctant to keep its predecessors’ promises to its 
minorities sought to exploit popular majoritarian understandings of history, heritage 
and nationhood. Its Prime Minister recognised the particular potency of the Dharahara 
for the hill communities that formed his party’s main constituency, and sought to 
amplify the public mourning for a building that was seen by many as a celebration, its 
‘nose held high’, of their embattled national pride. The post-earthquake nationalism 
that quickly prevailed was a major diversion from the discourse of inclusiveness and 
minority ethnic assertion that had formed an important part of Nepali political debate 
for the previous seven years.  
 
The iconisation and reconstruction of the Dharahara was opposed by some, none the 
less.  Three weeks after the quake, the renowned senior cultural scholar Satyamohan 
Joshi wrote in the leading Nepali-language daily Kantipur that the reason Japan had 
become a major power in the world despite suffering repeated natural disasters was its 
people’s strong sense of their national identity. But he then went on to argue that despite 
all the grief that had been expressed about the loss of the Dharahara it was much less 
important than the scores of Newar-style temples that had also been destroyed.  The 
temples, he said, had their own originality and identity, while the Dharahara did not:  
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…it contains no art, no image, no roof, no carving.  There is no originality there.  It is just an imitation 
inspired by the thought that we should build a minaret in the style of the Qutb Minar built by the Muslims 
in Delhi.  Nepal has not claimed that it was heritage built by the ancestors.  We just regarded it as a pillar 
in the centre of the city that everyone’s eyes fell upon….. If it has to be rebuilt it would be all right to 
build it in a new style. (Joshi 2015) 
 
However, the temples and palace squares of the Valley’s cities were viewed by a wider 
national public as less their own than the Dharahara—as artefacts specifically of the 
medieval Newar culture of the Valley, or as ticketed attractions for foreign tourists. A 
representational dichotomy was very clearly evident: when the need arose to 
pictorialise the loss of cultural heritage incurred during the 2015 earthquake, the outside 
world invariably reached for images of collapsed and damaged Newar sites and 
buildings, but it was the Dharahara that dominated the images presented in the Nepali 
language media.   
 
Walkowitz and Knauer caution against the notion of a single ‘public’, pointing out that 
in many diverse societies factors of race, class, gender and citizenship ‘shape 
individuals’ investment in national narratives and the way in which they view 
themselves in relationship to the public sphere—including debates over public history 
sites.’ They argue that we should conceive of ‘multiple publics with divergent and often 
competing interests and different stakes in how histories are represented’ (2009:3). 
What were the boundaries and contours of the Nepali public that took the Dharahara to 
its heart as a symbol of both loss and pride?  To borrow Simpson’s words again, to 
which Nepali public was the Dharahara ‘dear’? To understand this dichotomy it would 
be necessary to explore the structure and composition of the Nepali public more deeply.  
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This lies beyond the scope of the present discussion,xxix but some preliminary remarks 
will be offered here none the less. 
 
Some explanations for the relationship between the Dharahara and the public that held 
it dear may be sought in the nature of the monument itself. First of all, it was tall, visible 
and fabled: the dominant landmark of the capital city of Nepal. The iconic status it held 
for nearly 200 years was clearly due in part to the simple fact that it was an object whose 
simple, primary and very male shape was visible from a wide radius within the capital 
valley.  It was, after all, the tallest structure in the Kathmandu valley for at least six 
generations of the Nepali public (Sapkota 2015). But it is probably also significant that 
(despite the Sidewalkers signboard’s claim that it was a symbol of religious unity) the 
Dharahara was perceived to be a secular building, emotionally and politically available 
to all, regardless of their religious faith.  During the Panchayat period (1962-90), when 
nationalist sentiment was energetically fostered by the monarchical government around 
the three pillars of Hinduism, the Shah monarchy and the Nepali language, Nepali poets 
often name checked the monument as an artefact of national history or imagined it as a 
vantage point from which to survey Nepal. (This was only a poetic conceit, of course, 
because public access to the tower was not granted until 2061 bs (2004-5).)xxx  
 
The Dharahara was also an important landmark for those who arrived in the capital by 
road from other parts of the country.  The Sundhara locality in which it stood has long 
been a transport hub, and the ticket offices of many domestic bus companies are still 
located there.  Thus, for many Nepalis arriving in their capital after journeys that may 
have lasted for more than 24 hours, the Dharahara, along with nearby monuments such 
as the Ghantaghar (the clocktower of Trichandra College) and the 17th-century 
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manmade pool of Rani Pokhari, were the first things to be seen, and they became more 
familiar as emblems of the capital than the pagoda-scape of palaces and shrines that lies 
just a few minutes’ walk away.  As the journalist Sarala Gautam told me, ‘The heritage 
sites may be important for people who live here [in Kathmandu] but for those who have 
come for the first time, or who have been visited once, or have never come here, it’s 
the Dharahara.’xxxi  
 
Answers may also be sought in divergences in educational history, socio-economic 
class, and ethnicity.  During the Panchayat period (1962-90), generations of 
schoolchildren were taught in state schools that Bhimsen Thapa, the creator of the 
Dharahara, was Nepal’s first prime minister and a heroic defender of Nepal’s 
independence and sovereignty, while the Ranas, whose regime succeeded his, were 
tyrants and obstacles to the nation’s development.xxxii This clear distinction, propagated 
through the state school curriculum, found new resonance in the aftermath of the 2015 
earthquake.  Writing in the ‘earthquake special’ issue of the leading Nepali-language 
literary magazine Madhupark, the poet Geeta Tripathi harks back to the media reports 
of people stealing bricks from the ruins of the Dharahara (many of these bricks dated 
from the 1934 reconstruction and bore the inscription ‘Juddha 1991’): 
 
The statue of Juddha Shamsher Rana [that stands] nearby is watching the sorry state of the Dharahara, 
but it is feeling happy because of the popularity of the bricks that are etched with its name—it is more 
concerned about having a permanent place in history than it is with people’s suffering (Tripathi 2015: 
45). 
 
This distinction between the regimes of Bhimsen Thapa and the Ranas who came soon 
after him may not have been imparted to younger members of the capital’s present-day 
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elite, many of whom were educated outside the state system after the early 1990s. As a 
consequence, many of them see the two regimes as one and the same, and they maintain 
a disdainful attitude to the Dharahara and to the public outpouring of grief at its loss. 
 
The monument’s historical and political salience for contemporary Nepal might also be 
expected to be contested by the Janajati organisations that have been challenging the 
continued monopolisation of power and privilege by the descendants of the historical 
Gorkhali elite since the political liberalisation of the 1990s. But many members of 
minority groups were also a part of the Nepali public that not only held the Dharahara 
‘dear’ but was also receptive to the rallying cry of Gorkhali hill nationalism that led to 
the re-marginalisation of the country’s Madhesi population and a serious deterioration 
in India-Nepal relations. 
 
Conclusion 
The case of the Dharahara shows that endogenous evaluations of ‘heritage’ can be 
inflected by questions of politics, social class, and power.  Albala-Bertrand has 
observed that the exogenous response to a disaster is ‘more easily observable’ than the 
endogenous response, and, therefore, ‘more amenable to study’ (1993: 23). The fact 
that the ‘dearness’ of a particular monument to a large portion of a disaster-affected 
national public was unsuspected by the world heritage authorities, and even 
disappointed other sections of the same national public, shows that those authorities’ 
understanding of this particular public was limited, as was perhaps also this public’s 
understanding of itself. 
A major earthquake strikes.  Monuments, houses, schools and infrastructure 
collapse.  Many people die. The first to respond to the emergency are the army, urban 
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youth, neighbouring countries.  Political leaders are publicly criticised for the 
inadequacy of their preparedness and the slowness of their response.  People speak, 
read and write of the unifying and leveling effects of the disaster.  Some begin to 
imagine a future under a new set of leaders with a new political culture.  When the 
leaders do respond, they respond politically: they come together to draft and promulgate 
a long-awaited constitution.  This is seen by some to renege on promises and 
commitments made eight years earlier.  In particular, it alienates the Madhesi 
population of the lowlands, leading to public protests, violence, and a major 
international dispute. The leaders manage to unite the non-elite majority of the hill 
population behind them, a population for whom a tall white tower in Kathmandu, 
erected in an act of ‘state-sponsored triumphalism’ (Winter 1999) two hundred years 
ago—is revealed to be more dear (Simpson 2013) than anyone knew, both as a symbol 
of their loss and an icon for the restoration of that loss. The immediate loss is of lives 
and buildings, but this public also mourns a dimly remembered glorious national pride, 
especially as the promulgation of a new constitution provokes what they are told is a 
‘blockade’ by their powerful southern neighbour. Thus, as the moment of critical 
juncture passes and the likelihood of fundamental political and cultural change fades, 
old memories and old forgettings (Abramson 1999) are drawn upon, in order to reinstate 
in strengthened and ‘accelerated’ forms the power structures and hierarchies of the pre-
disaster status quo. 
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5. The remains of the Dharahara, July 2015. Photograph: Michael Hutt 
6. The design on a Dharahara t-shirt, purchased by the author in Asan bazaar, 
Kathmandu, in 2017.  Photograph: Michael Hutt 
7. A replica Dharahara, on the Prithvi Highway near Malekhu, December 2017. 
Photograph: Michael Hutt 
8. A replica Dharahara at the Shahid Gate traffic intersection, Kathmandu.   
Photograph: Michael Hutt. 
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9. Artist’s impression of a reconstructed Dharahara, from The Kathmandu Post, 1 
August 2016. http://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2016-08-01/designs-
of-new-dharahara-made-public.html 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
i This paper is based upon research conducted as a part of the project ‘After the Earth’s 
Violent Sway: the tangible and intangible legacies of a natural disaster’ funded by the 
UK’s Global Challenges Research Fund through the Arts and Humanities Research 
Council.  Grant number AH/P003648/1.  All translations from Nepali are the author’s 
own. My thanks go to Stefanie Lotter, Edward Simpson, John Whelpton, Pratyoush 
Onta, Yogesh Raj, Tek Bahadur Shrestha, Rabi Charan Shrestha, Abhi Subedi, Geeta 
Tripathi, Satyamohan Joshi, and the two anonymous reviewers of an earlier draft of this 
article.   
ii A key strand of the ‘Violent Sway’ project is the creation of an extensive digital 
archive of materials on the 2015 Nepal earthquake [https://digital.soas.ac.uk/SWAY], 
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which will constitute a new section of the wider SOAS Digital Library.  The research 
for the present article draws heavily on published material gathered for this archive 
during brief research visits to Nepal in 2015 and 2016 and a four-month stay in 2017-
2018, as well as on interviews and conversations with journalists, writers, politicians 
and a wide range of ordinary citizens over a similar period.   
iii The Dharahara’s place in Nepal’s national history is also assured by a legend 
according to which Jang Bahadur Kunwar, whose 1846 massacre of all his rivals 
marginalized the Shah monarchy and established the rule of the Rana family which 
lasted until 1951, jumped on his horse from the top of the Dharahara to the pavement— 
for a wager in some versions of the story, at the command of Crown Prince Surendra 
in others.  
iv The first two Shah monarchs of the 19th century were minors.  The first, Girvan 
Yuddha Shah, died in 1816 at the age of 19 and was succeeded by the three year old 
Rajendra Bikram Shah. 
v The Dharahara that survived into the 20th century was often referred to in English as 
‘Bhimsen’s Tower’ or ‘Bhimsen’s Folly’, and sometimes in Nepali as Bhimsen 
Stambha.    
vi British Library Hodgson archive Vol 44 (ff. 38b item 2).  
www.digitalhimalaya/hodgson 
vii Lalit Tripura Sundari, the youngest queen of Ran Bahadur Shah, was widowed at 
the age of 12.  She was the regent queen during the minorities of kings Girvan 
Yuddha and Rajendra, and died on 6 April 1832. 
viii The Sidewalkers information boards at the base of the Dharahara inform visitors, 
rather confusingly, that the tower was built by the ‘First Prime Minister of Nepal 
Bhimsen Thapa in 1825 AD in the name of the Shah queen Lalit Tripura Sundari.’  
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ix Frederik William Waldemar (1817-45), Prince of Prussia, arrived in Kolkata in 
1844 and sketches from his subsequent journey across north India and Nepal may be 
viewed in the online archive of the University of Heidelberg.  [http://digi.ub.uni-
heidelberg.de/diglit/mahlmann1853bd1/0222?sid=08bf1c60bc60fb0564ee7252af3633
e1. The sketch of the Bagh Darbar reproduced as Plate 1 clearly shows a lone 
Dharahara; the text that accompanies the sketch records that a second tower had 
collapsed in the 1833 earthquake and that its debris still covered the site. My thanks to 
Stefanie Lotter for alerting me to the existence of this resource. 
x Bhimsen’s creation of the Dharahara was probably also inspired by some measure of  
personal conceit.  He already had caged tigers at the gates of his Bagh (Tiger) Palace: 
why not a Mughal minaret too? The Shah and Rana elites had adopted other strands of 
Persianate cultural pretension, including a special honorific form of address and a 
special verb conjugation for the actions of family members. 
xi Dixit (2015), who grew up very close by, recalls that the bugle was sounded from 
the Dharahara to mark Democracy Day on the seventh day of the month of Phagun 
every year after the end of the Rana regime. 
xii Personal communication, Kathmandu, 1 August 2016. 
xiii Acharya Prabha, ‘E mero Dharahara’ [Oh my Dharahara], Setopati, 26 April 2015 
http://www.archive.setopati.com/sahityapati/27408 
xiv Niru Tripathi, ‘Albida Dharahara’ [Farewell Dharahara], Setopati 26 April 2015, 
http://www.archive.setopati.com/sahityapati/27394. See also Pushparaj Paudel, ‘Priya 
Dharahara’ [Dear Dharahara],  Setopati, 25 April 2015, 
http://www.archive.setopati.com/sahityapati/27376 
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xv ‘Dharaharako inta chorna mahasachivko nirdeshan’ [Chief Secretary’s instruction to 
steal Dharahara bricks]   http://www.onlinekhabar.com/2015/04/271527, accessed 21 
May 2016.    
xvi ‘Dharaharaka inta damping sait lagindai sarkari adhikari bhanchan: matlab chaina’ 
[As Dharahara bricks are taken away to a dumping site, a government official says: it 
doesn’t matter], www.onlinekhabar.com/2016/05/429704, 19 May 2016, accessed 21 
May 2016.  
xvii Anon. ‘Cost of corruption’ The Kathmandu Post  9 August 2015. 
xviii Six days after the earthquake, it was reported that fifty bodies had been dug out of 
the ruins so far (‘Dharaharabata pachas shav nikaliyo’ [Fifty bodies removed from 
Dharahara], Kantipur 1 May 2015).   Sapkota (2015) gives a final figure of 155 
fatalities, Ojha (2016) of 180. 
xix ‘Dharaharama banchepachi: ghau birsera sapna pachyaundai’ [After surviving in the 
Dharahara: forgetting wounds, pursuing a dream] Nagarik News 23 April 2016. Other 
Dharahara survivor stories include Kamansingh Khadka, ‘Aphaimathi Dharahara 
khasdai gareko dekhda’ [Seeing the Dharahara falling upon me] Shabda Sanyojan 12.2: 
293-7; ‘Dharahara chadhnu aghi usle gareko antim myasaj’ [The last message he sent 
before climbing the Dharahara] (Setopati 25 April 2016); Swarup Acharya,  
‘Dharaharale malai nilena’ [The Dharahara did not swallow me] (Kantipur 30 April 
2015).    Four of the 16 survivor stories collected by Harihar Pokharel (2072: 109-33) 
concern Dharahara survivors.  See also ‘Surviving the fall’, Nepali Times 12-18 
February 2016 [http://archive.nepalitimes.com/article/Nepali-Times-Buzz/surviving-
the-fall-from-Dharara,2865]  A similar story appeared on the British news site Daily 
Mail Online on 28 April 2015: 
http://www.dailymail.co.uk/indiahome/indianews/article-3059671/Man-atop-nine-
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storey-Dharahara-tower-Kathmandu-quake-struck-lives-tell-tale-survival.html, 
accessed 16 May 2016. 
xx ‘Dharahara’s replica being built in Nawalparasi, Setopati, 25 April 2016 
[http://setopati.net/society/13408, accessed 25/4/2016]. ‘Navalparasima 25 lakh 
kharcha garera banaindai cha yasto Dharahara’ [This Dharahara is being built in 
Nawalparasi at a cost of 25 lakhs].  http://sajhasabal.com/nawalparasi/news/dharahara-
in-nawalparasi/, 25 April 2016. 
xxi youtube.com/watch?v=w_ScCEK05fQ. See also the short drama on Youtube 
entitled ‘Dharahara A Dream’ by Sunil Young 
https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=9xEFvztUURk 
xxii The reconstruction of Kasthamandap, reputedly Kathmandu’s oldest building 
which gave the city its name, remained mired in controversy at the time of writing.  
See Bhattarai (2018). 
xxiii ‘“Dharahara” rastrako parichay ho, janatako sahabhagitama punanirman’ 
[Dharahara is a feature of the nation, reconstruction with public involvement]  
http://medianp.com/2016/5/84874.html, accessed 5/6/2016. ‘Dharahara punanirmanka 
lagi kosh sthapana’ [Fund established for Dharahara reconbstruction] 
https://hamrakura.com/news-details/7838/2016-05-01 (1 May 2016); ‘Dharahara tin 
varshabhitra banaune’ [Dharahara to be built within three years]  
http://ujyaaloonline.com/news/57146/dharahara/. 8 May 2016 [SP160516A3] 
xxiv ‘Dharahara Reconstruction Campaign in limbo over lack of fund’ Republica  29 
March 2016, 
xxv ‘Kasle banaune Dharahara?’ [Who will rebuild the Dharahara?] by Suresh 
Nyaupane.  Nepal Patrika weekly,  http://ekantipur.com/np/2072/4/18/full-
story/413956.html.  Accessed 3/8/15. 
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xxvi These are: Kathmandu Durbar Square; Bhaktapur Durbar Square; Patan Durbar 
Square; Swayambhu Stupa; Pashupati Temple; Bouddha stupa; Changu Narayan 
temple. 
xxvii ‘Sketch of to-be-built Dharahara made public’ (Post report) The Kathmandu Post, 
2 August 2016. 
xxviii As reported in The Kathmandu Post on 27 December 2018.  
[https://kathmandupost.ekantipur.com/news/2018-12-27/pm-oli-lays-foundation-for-
dharahara-reconstruction-amid-protest-from-cultural-activists.html].  The report 
describes the original Dharahara inaccurately as an ‘18th-century’ structure and 
records that the laying of the foundation stone was accompanied by protests by 
cultural activists objecting to the use of concrete in the reconstruction. 
 
xxix For a collection of essays on the relationship between political change and public 
culture in Nepal see Hutt and Onta (eds) 2017.   
xxx Siddhicharan Shrestha’s rapturous account of the beauty of the Kathmandu Valley 
as seen from the top of the tower was published shortly after the 1934 earthquake and 
is probably the most famous poem to adopt this particular trope. Siddhicharan Shrestha: 
‘Dharaharamathibata’ [From the top of the Dharahara], from Shrestha 2031 b.s.: 19-20.  
Poem first published in Sharada in 1935-6 [1992 b.s.]) 
xxxi Sarala Gautam, recorded interview, Lalitpur, 29 November 2017. 
xxxii Geeta Tripathi, personal communication, Kathmandu, 6 December 2017. 
